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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 09-1913 
___________ 
 
GREGORY F. JOHNSON, 
             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NBC UNIVERSAL, INC. 
_______________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 D.C. Civil Action No. 2-08-cv-03780 
 (Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 October 4, 2010 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed: November 30, 2010) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Gregory F. Johnson appeals the denial of his motion to remand to state court a 
breach of contract action related to his employment with NBC Universal, Inc.  We will 
affirm. 
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I. 
 Gregory F. Johnson was employed by NBC Universal, Inc. on Law & Order 
Special Victims Unit from September 12, 2006 until July 16, 2007.  Johnson began work 
as a grip, but was promoted to the best boy position within two months of starting at 
NBC.  During the entire time Johnson was employed by NBC, he was represented 
exclusively by the International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees, Local 
Union 52. 
 The union negotiated a Collective Bargaining Agreement with a number of 
television and film companies, including NBC, that contained, among other things, terms 
of Johnson’s employment, including a grievance procedure.  Notably, the CBA 
authorized the Union to directly negotiate form deal memoranda on behalf of its members 
with employers covered by the CBA.  Deal memos are signed by the employee and a 
specific employer and contain additional employment provisions specific to the 
employer.  Two such form deal memoranda negotiated by the Union were applied to 
Johnson’s employment at NBC on September 11, 2006 and April 16, 2007.  The deal 
memos referenced and attached NBC policies, including a Policy Against Harassment. 
 Johnson contends his supervisor, Paul Volo, harassed him in derogation of the 
Policy from November 2006 onward.  He reported this harassment on January 29, 2007 
to Gail Barringer, who was designated by the Policy to receive such complaints.  NBC 
subsequently terminated Johnson’s employment on July 16, 2007.  Johnson filed a 
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complaint of harassment with NBC’s Ombudsperson as directed by the Policy, but did 
not file a grievance under the CBA. 
 Johnson sued NBC in New Jersey state court contending it breached the Policy 
Against Harassment, which he argued was a stand-alone contract.  NBC removed the 
action to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on the grounds 
Johnson’s claim was preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Act (LMRA), 
29 U.S.C. § 185.  Johnson moved to remand the case to state court contending the District 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). 
 The District Court denied Johnson’s motion, holding his claim was completely 
preempted by the LMRA.  The District Court then dismissed Johnson’s claim with 
prejudice because the parties did not dispute Johnson had failed to exhaust the mandatory 
grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the CBA.  Johnson timely appealed. 
 On appeal, Johnson only presents arguments contesting the District Court’s denial 
of his motion to remand.  Johnson contends the District Court improperly denied his 
motion to remand because his action is not substantially dependent on interpretation of a 
collective bargaining agreement.1 
II. 
 
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
a denial of a motion to remand.  See Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 665 (3d 
Cir. 2002).   
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 A District Court must grant a motion to remand if it lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. § 1447; see Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 
(1987).  Accordingly, we must address whether the District Court had federal subject 
matter jurisdiction over Johnson’s claim.  Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 251 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
 Ordinarily, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, in order to be removable, 
federal jurisdiction must be pleaded in a plaintiff’s complaint.  See Pascack Valley Hosp. 
v. Local 464A UFCW Welfare Reimbursement Plan, 388 F.3d 393, 399 (3d Cir. 2004).  
“[A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including 
the defense of preemption . . . .”  Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.  But the doctrine of 
complete preemption creates an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule  Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004); Pascack, 388 F.3d at 400. 
 Under the doctrine of complete preemption, “Congress may so completely pre-
empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is 
necessarily federal in character.”  Pascack, 388 F.3d at 400 (quotation omitted).  State 
law claims are completely preempted by the LMRA when the claims are “substantially 
dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor 
contract . . . .”  Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985); see Kline, 386 
F.3d at 252. 
 The District Court properly concluded Johnson’s claim would be substantially 
dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor 
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contract.  Johnson’s argument the Policy Against Harassment is a stand-alone contract is 
unpersuasive.  The CBA explicitly authorizes the negotiation of deal memos between the 
Union and employers covered by the CBA, including NBC.  The 2007 Deal Memo 
signed by Johnson states in relevant part: “This deal memo and any applicable collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) shall constitute our full understanding and shall supersede 
any oral or written terms not specifically set forth on this memo or in its attachments.”  
Accordingly, as the District Court noted, the CBA and Deal Memos together memorialize 
the terms of agreement negotiated between NBC and the Union.  Cf. Caterpillar, 482 
U.S. at 395; Beidleman v. Stroh Brewing Co., 182 F.3d 225, 230-31 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Johnson implicitly acknowledged this when he initialed the 2006 and 2007 Deal Memos 
“As Per 52,” and “As Per Local 52.” 
 Moreover, the Deal Memos incorporate NBC policies including the Policy Against 
Harassment.  The 2007 Deal Memo specifically lists and incorporates the Policy by 
reference.  See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 204.  “[T]he right asserted . . . derives from 
the contract . . . [and] any attempt to assess liability here inevitably will involve contract 
interpretation.”  Id. at 218.  Although Johnson did not acknowledge receipt of the Policy 
on the face of the Deal Memos, he does not contest he signed the Deal Memos or 
received the Policy Against Harassment. 
 Johnson’s argument that the CBA and Policy complaint processes are in conflict 
only underlines that his claim is substantially dependent on interpretation of the terms of 
agreement in the labor contract at issue.  The CBA, Deal Memos, and the Policy all must 
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be interpreted to determine whether the complaint procedures are mutually exclusive and, 
if so, which complaint procedure controls.  The complaint procedures are not mutually 
exclusive.  The grievance procedure in the CBA requires the Union and the employer to 
resolve “[a]ll complaints, disputes or questions as to the interpretation, application or 
performance of [the CBA] . . . .” using procedures set forth in the CBA.  Conversely, the 
Policy requires the employee to report the conduct to NBC so it may investigate the 
allegation and determine whether it will take remedial action.  Accordingly, the Union’s 
filing and resolution of a grievance on behalf of Johnson would not be inconsistent with 
Johnson’s notice to NBC of the purported harassment.  But even if the procedures were 
inconsistent, Johnson’s claim is completely preempted because both the CBA and the 
Policy would need to be interpreted to determine which is controlling. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
